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I. Introduction 
 
Following the recent calamity of the US financial system and correction thereof, 
the US government authorities have endeavored to shore up the failing economy by 
drastically cutting interest rates and injecting stimulus packages to the various needed 
areas. Both of these measures are directly related to the US money supply, particularly 
to increase it in order to create wealth in the short-term and revive the economic system. 
The impact of these policies can be deep and wide-reaching in a global scale and hardly 
any country and anyone can remain isolated from the wave. Of course, for that very 
reason, US money supply and its potential impact on various sides of the economy, 
domestic or abroad, has long been a popular topic of interest in macroeconomics 
producing vast amount of literature. 
This paper looks at the history of trade between South Korea and the US as well 
as other economic factors to uncover the relationship between US monetary policy and 
the Korean economy. Inspired by the ubiquity of US monetary policy and its impact on 
the global arena1, this paper will look through its certain aspects that are deeply 
connected to one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. A vast amount of literature 
has been produced explaining the relationship between US monetary shock and its 
                                            
1 For a simple example, the impact of US monetary policy changes stretches far away even to sovereign 
bond spreads—bonds issued by sovereigns—in emerging market. 
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impact on other economies; however, research about Korea has been relatively limited. 
This paper revisits existing theories on foreign monetary shocks in an empirical 
framework using Korea as the subject country of interest. The contribution of this study 
is that we expand the study period to comprehensively cover decades of trade history. 
Having an extensive study period has several advantages: it allows us to filter minor 
disruptions or anomalies and observe the general development. This has the effect of 
stating our findings with greater certainty. 
Korea has been chosen as the subject country of interest as it has undergone a 
dynamic history of development in a mere 50 years time span. The US is its major 
trading partner and is connected to the Korean economy inside and out which naturally 
won selection.
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II. Existing Scholarly Literature Survey 
 
In answering the posed question of how US monetary policy affects Korea’s 
economy, much of the analysis will be based on existing studies and frameworks that 
have been confirmed through time. Therefore, it is critical that a review of the existing 
theories and empirical work on monetary transmission—domestic as well as 
international—be provided and determine which studies or aspects of studies apply to 
this research the most. In doing so, there are largely three areas of interests that need to 
be addressed in order to understand the full dynamics of international monetary 
transmission: domestic channels of monetary transmission, international channels of 
monetary transmission and finally, capital controls which may restrict free flow of 
international monetary transmission and its impact into a country. This chapter will 
discuss the relevant works done in these areas by first introducing the background 
theory and then extending it to empirical studies that have been conducted. 
 
1) Domestic Channels of Monetary Transmission 
“How does monetary policy, at the core of government’s operations to bail out 
the economy, affect the various aspects of the economy and how is it transmitted?” This 
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provocative question represents one of the major ongoing disputes in macroeconomics 
and while many theories have been set forth to solve this puzzle, we will discuss 
henceforth two of the most widely trusted and cited views in this area: (i) the interest 
rate channel, and (ii) the credit channel. 
 
A. Interest Rate Channel (Money View) 
 Simply put, the interest rate channel (the money view) explains that changes in 
monetary policy such as a decrease in the money supply or federal funds rate affects the 
economy through changes in interest rates, hence its name. Particularly, when the 
economy is in a bad state, the government/Federal Reserve (referred to as the Fed 
henceforth) can take actions to intervene. These actions consist of reducing the federal 
funds rate, expanding the monetary base by purchasing bonds in the market (commonly 
referred to as the open-market operations) or imposing/relaxing regulations to bank 
lending practices (e.g., changing reserve-requirement ratio). All these actions inject 
liquidity to the market by practically releasing more money in circulation and in the 
short term, these actions effectively bolster the economy. 
 Let us walk through a simple example to see more clearly how this works. To 
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keep the story simple suppose that there are two assets—money and bonds.2 In a 
monetary expansion, the central bank increases the reserves, strengthening the banking 
system’s ability to sell deposits. Depositors (households), faced with increased supply of 
money, must then hold more money and less bonds in their portfolios. If prices do not 
instantaneously adjust to changes in the money supply, the increase in household money 
holdings represents an increase in real money balances (remember, real money balances 
is equal to nominal money supply divided by price and since money supply increased 
while price stayed fixed real money balances will increase as a result). To restore 
equilibrium, the real interest rate on bonds declines, lowering the user (i.e., issuers of 
these bonds) cost of capital for a range of investment activities, and interest-sensitive 
spending increases. Note that increased household money holdings translate into 
increased spending which together with increased investment activities helps the 
economy to expand. In the long run, however, prices will adjust and higher inflation will 
absorb the effects of the economic expansion. 
 While the money view is widely accepted as the benchmark or “textbook” 
model for analyzing effects of monetary policy on economic activity, its completeness 
has been in doubt and an alternative proposition, the credit view, has been put forward 
                                            
2 This example is borrowed from R. Glenn Hubbard’s Is there a “Credit Channel” for Monetary Policy? 
published in May/June 1995 Review from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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to better explain the distributional aspects of monetary transmission mechanism. More 
precisely, the money view has the disadvantage that it is unable to completely explain 
the over-reaction of output responses (GDP) to relatively small monetary innovations 
(Hubbard 2005, Ferri and Kang 1999, Bernanke and Blinder 1992). This will be further 
discussed in the following section introducing the credit view and how it complements 
some of the shortcomings of the traditional money view. But before we proceed any 
further, let us visit some of the empirical studies that hold relevance to our study. 
 In a recent study done by Lo (2005), the interest rate channel has been reported 
to be at work in propagating economic impact of interest rate shifts within a small 
country. Particularly, he finds that “in response to a US contractionary monetary shock, 
the interest rate of the small country overshoots in the short run and deflates the 
economy so excessively that domestic currency depreciates and net exports revive, and 
that, in turn, eases the negative impact on domestic output” (Lo, 2005). The results 
stand as a great indicator of not only an interest rate channel at work but also an 
international transmission channel through which US monetary shocks can dictate 
interest rate movements of a small country.  
 In another recent study done by Pobre (2003), he finds evidence of an interest 
rate channel in Korea as well as Thailand and Philippines. His study of the three 
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developing Asian countries reveals that in response to a shock to the country’s policy 
rate (federal funds rate equivalent), the money market rate (short term interest) 
experiences sharp fluctuations which causes the real GDP to draw a ‘hump-shape’ curve. 
The dramatic decline in real GDP is found to be common across countries and fixed 
capital investment which is most interest-sensitive experiences a major blow. However, 
he also notices a tighter credit market conditions develop following monetary shocks 
which usually is an indicator of the presence of a credit channel, an alternative 
transmission mechanism to the interest rate channel. Similar studies (Domac and Ferri, 
2005; Kim, 2007; Goh and Yong, 2007) also point to the existence of a credit channel in 
South Korea and Malaysia after accounting for the effects of an interest rate channel in 
transmitting monetary policy shocks. (Hubbard, 1995; Pobre, 2003; Lo, 2005, Domac 
and Ferri, 2005; Kim, 2007; Goh and Yong, 2007)  
 
B. Credit Channel (Credit View) 
In response to some of the shortcomings identified in the previous model, many 
economists set forth a new strand of literature on a credit channel through which 
monetary actions can affect the economy unreachable by the interest rate channel. First 
let us focus on some of the aspects of the money view that are deemed overly simplistic 
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or miscalculated.  
 The money view asserts that changes in short-term interest rate induced by 
monetary shocks affect the real economy by shifting investment and consumption 
decisions by firms and households. It is then natural to think that changes in interest-
sensitive spending in response to monetary innovations match reasonably well with 
observed output responses to such innovations. However, empirical studies have shown 
that the observed aggregate output responses to monetary innovations have been 
generally large compared to the relatively small estimated innovations in monetary 
policies.3 Below is a simple illustration of this argument depicting the evolution of US 
ln(GDP) and Fed Funds Rate during the years 1957–2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
3 Kashyap Stein and Wilcox (1993) have shown that the log ratio of commercial loans to commercial 
paper is a crucial determinant in investment and inventory spending even though interest-rate effects are 
usually not significant 
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Figure 2: US GDP vs. US Fed Funds Rate 
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 The dark blue line represents US GDP while the one underneath colored in pink 
denotes the Fed Funds Rate. While there appears to be a mutual trend between the two 
variables, the development of US GDP is relatively more stable and constant compared 
to that of Fed Funds Rate. Although the graphical analysis does not reveal too much 
fluctuations of GDP in response to innovations in Fed Funds Rate, in the simplest terms, 
we can easily see that the relationship between the two variables cannot be reasonably 
defined linearly or in any other similar way. Thus it is natural to beg for an alternative 
way to explain the linkage between output and interest rates. 
 The search for a transmission mechanism broader than the interest rate channel 
reflects two concerns, one “macro” and one “micro” (Hubbard 1995). The macro 
concern, discussed earlier, attempts to explain the considerable fluctuation in aggregate 
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demand other than using simple changes in interest rates. Indeed, there seems to be 
other latent factors influenced by interest rate changes that in turn also effect changes in 
investment and/or gross output. Efforts by macroeconomists to uncover such factors 
have led to the development of an accelerator model establishing a propagation 
mechanism whereby even a minimal innovation to interest rate can be magnified. 
 The micro concern relates to the growing strand of literature studying 
informational imperfections in insurance and credit markets. According to this line of 
inquiry, the informational asymmetry between borrowers and lenders lead to an 
increased gap in external cost of financing and internal finance. This particular notion of 
a gap between the cost of external finance and internal finance for borrowers is central 
to the idea of credit channel which separates itself from the traditional money view. In 
this context, the credit view offers channels through which monetary policy can affect 
this gap (Hubbard, 1995). That is, the credit view aims at explaining how external 
financing “premium” accelerates the whole process of monetary shocks to the economy. 
We now proceed to study two such channels discussed in earlier work. (Hubbard, 1995; 
Hulsewig, Mayer, and Wollmershauser, 2005; Copelman and Werner, 1997; Lane, 2001; 
Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Agung, 2002; Mishkin, 2001) 
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i) Balance Sheet Effect 
The fundamental building block of the credit view assumes that certain 
borrowers face high external financing cost. In addition, the accelerator model 
previously mentioned argues that the spread between the cost of external and internal 
funds varies inversely with the borrower’s net worth (Hubbard 1995). Intuitively, this 
assertion makes perfect sense since low net worth represents significant amount of risk 
to the lender, and therefore, the borrower must compensate the lender for taking any 
additional risk. So how would this be any important in explaining the effects of 
monetary shocks to the economy? First, for the sake of simplicity, let us assume 
borrower’s net worth to be total asset minus total liability. Under this assumption and 
within the context of the accelerator model, given a contraction in the money supply and 
the ensuing increase in real interest rate will adversely affect firms’ balance sheet by 
increasing their debt-service burdens (liability) and reducing the present value of 
collateralizable net worth. Now, with their net worth suddenly having declined in value, 
firms react to the increased marginal cost of external financing by cutting down desired 
investment spending and employment programs. This approach implies that spending 
by low net worth firms will fall significantly following a monetary contraction. 
(Mishkin, 2001; Choi and Cook, 2004; Kim, 1999; Wesche, 2000) 
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ii) Bank Lending Channel 
The second channel stresses that some borrowers depend heavily on banks for 
external funds, and that policy actions can have a direct effect on the supply of loans. 
When banks are subject to legal restrictions on their lending practices (e.g., reserve 
requirement ratio) a contraction in the money supply can drain reserves and possibly 
decrease banks’ ability to lend. As a result, credit allocated to bank dependent borrowers 
may fall, inducing these borrowers to curtail spending. In the IS-LM model4 framework, 
this represents leftward shift in both the IS and LM curves in response to monetary 
contraction. Alternatively, an adverse shock to banks’ capital could decrease both banks’ 
lending and the spending by bank dependent borrowers. Such bank lending channel 
magnifies the decline in output as a result of the monetary contraction, apart from the 
interest rate channel. 
 The recent financial crisis and the government’s action to cope with this 
calamity is a living example of this channel at work. In today’s tight credit conditions, it 
became incredibly difficult for any individual or firm to apply for a loan. This comes as 
no surprise as banks are now more careful in deciding whom to lend than in the past 
                                            
4 The IS-LM model is a well supported, regarded theory in economics explaining the short run 
fluctuations in interest rate and output. The IS curve is a downward sloping curve representing savings 
and investment which together with the LM curve, an upward sloping curve, determines the equilibrium 
interest rate and output in an economy. Any external shocks (e.g., oil shocks, weather shocks, increase in 
taxes, etc,.) may shift them up and down until they adjust and come back to a new equilibrium. please just 
reference a textbook here. Say Krugman and Obstfeld? 
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days, and furthermore, banks have raised premiums attached to their loans (i.e., external 
cost of financing has gone up). Firms, unable to finance new initiatives, must forego 
every new lucrative investment opportunities which aggravates the already tormented 
state by further reducing their net worth which, in turn, raises the cost of external 
financing even further. In response to such a vicious cycle, the government has decided 
to step in to facilitate investment spending of firms and inject liquidity into banks’ 
balance sheets by reducing fed funds rate to an unprecedented zero percent level and 
lending money to financial intermediaries. This whole process is founded on the 
premise that government’s expansionary efforts will flow through the bank lending 
channel to increase bank reserves, increase loan supply, facilitate investment spending 
and eventually turn around the current economic crisis. Of course, the interest rate 
channel is also at work in that cheap capital (zero-percent short term interest) will 
stimulate interest-sensitive spending, but only in much simpler way.  
 In a study done by Kim (1999) to identify a credit channel at work, he finds 
convincing evidence that credit channel indeed played a key role in transmitting 
monetary shocks, especially following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. He observes 
that in response to a tightened monetary policy, bank lending (loan supply) experiences 
a marked decline which plays a key role in amplifying the real effects of stringent 
Page 16 | 73 
money supply. Other studies done by Carpenter (1999) and Ferri and Kang (1999) in the 
same period also unanimously report the existence of a distinct credit channel at work 
following the financial crisis during 1997. (Kim, 1999; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; 
Copelman and Werner, 1997; Ferri and Kang, 1999; Carpenter, 1999 Hulsewig, Mayer, 
and Wollmershauser, 2005) 
 
2) International Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism 
So far, we have discussed monetary policy and its transmission mechanism 
within a closed economy framework. Our analysis need not stop here, however. In order 
for us to analyze the effect of US monetary policy on the Korean economy it is crucial 
to extend our analytical framework to an international level. The crux of models of 
international monetary transmission is the subsequent adjustment of exchange rate to 
restore equilibrium after a certain shock is introduced. This section will contribute to 
discussing two of the main stream theories on international monetary transmission 
related to this study. 
 
A. Mundell-Fleming Model 
The Mundell-Fleming model was first set forth by Robert Mundell and Marcus 
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Fleming. The model is an extension of the standard workhorse in macroeconomics—the 
IS-LM model—to an open economy and is widely praised for integrating international 
capital flows into macroeconomic analysis. The country in consideration is assumed to 
be a small open economy acting as a price taker unable to exert any influence on the rest 
of the world. The model states that the relationship between nominal exchange rate and 
output can be explained by the interaction of three equations—IS-LM and Balance of 
Payment—in the short run. More formally (Mankiw, 2002): 
 
IS Curve: Y = C(Y – T) + I(r) + G + CA (ε, Y, Y*) 
LM Curve: M/P = L(r + πe, Y) 
Balance of Payment Curve: RG = CF (r – r*) + CA (ε, Y, Y*) 
 
Where (in order of appearance): 
 
Y ≡ output; 
C ≡ consumption; 
T ≡ taxes; 
I ≡ investment; 
r ≡ domestic real interest rate; 
G ≡ government spending; 
CA ≡ current account (also net exports); 
ε ≡ exchange rate (foreign currency in terms of domestic currency); 
Y* ≡ foreign output; 
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M ≡ money supply; 
P ≡ price level; 
L ≡ money demand; 
πe ≡ expected inflation; 
RG ≡ reserve gain (should equal zero in equilibrium); 
CF ≡ capital account; 
r* ≡ foreign real interest rate. 
 
And the following are assumed to hold: 
 
 (Disposable income and consumption have a positive relationship) 
 (Real interest rate and investment have a negative relationship) 
 (Exchange rate and net exports have a positive relationship) 
 (Foreign output and net exports have a positive relationship) 
 (Domestic output and liquidity have a positive relationship) 
 (Interest rate differential and capital account have a positive 
relationship) 
 Note that in order for the second equation to hold, the Marshall-Lerner 
condition must hold where the difference between elasticity of exports and imports must 
be greater than 1. In the short run, however, due to price stickiness price may not adjust 
instantaneously which may result in the violation of this condition. A major advantage 
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of this model arises from its flexibility to accommodate both fixed and flexible 
exchange rate systems which works well with Korea as it witnessed a shift in its 
exchange rate regime during the 1990s. (Mankiw, 2002 and Obstfeld, 2001) 
 
B. Obstfeld-Rogoff Redux Model 
The Obstfeld-Rogoff model was developed in 1995 borrowing certain 
underlying concepts from Mundell-Fleming while significantly departing in other 
assumptions. The mathematical foundation of this model goes well beyond the scope of 
this research and will thus be excluded; however, the implications of the model holds 
direct relevance to our analysis and will thus be discussed. The major assumptions of 
the model are as follows: 1) A model with two large countries (feedback between 
countries); 2) Prices are sticky in the short run and thus real exchange rate fluctuate; 3) 
When net exports are in disequilibrium countries change their wealth by 
saving/spending; 4) And this saving/spending is captured by the consumer’s utility 
function through demand for real money balances; 5) Leisure is valuable (there is a 
tradeoff between labor and leisure). With the above setup in mind, consider a  
 Under a fixed exchange rate regime, Lo (2002) finds that an increase in the 
interest rate of a large country will impact the small open economy in the short run by: 
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1) increasing the nominal interest rate and 2) decreasing domestic output while price, 
real exchange rate and current account remain unaffected. In the long run, prices 
decrease to adjust while all other variables stay fixed. In an empirical investigation, Lo 
finds convincing evidence of the Redux model at work in the short run. Following a 
contractionary monetary shock of the US, Hong Kong experiences a significant increase 
in nominal interest rate and output reduction. Net exports revive contrary to theoretical 
predictions by Mundell-Fleming and Obstfeld-Rogoff. The author explains that net 
exports revive in the short run possibly due to reduced cheaper goods and services from 
Hong Kong in real terms, albeit the faster upper adjustment in net exports than in 
downward prices on the immediate run. (Obstfeld, 2001; Lo, 2002) 
 
3) Capital Controls 
Following the Bretton Woods Agreements in July 1944, the world entered into a 
managed fixed exchange rate system maintained by fixing currency value in terms of 
gold and IMF acting as an international financial intermediary bridging temporary 
imbalances of payments. In the wake of 1970’s with the development of a complex 
financial system, the system collapsed after the United States unilaterally terminated 
convertibility of the dollar to gold. This action was soon followed by other developed 
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nations and the world quickly transformed to adopt flexible exchange rate regime where 
currency value was solely determined by free market forces. The world at present is 
majority flexible exchange rate driven as a result while a few other countries persist in 
having a pegged regime for strategic reasons.  
 In the case of Korea, the adoption of flexible exchange rate system came into 
serious consideration only with the occurrence and aggravation of the Asian Financial 
Crisis in late 1997. Prior to this event, Korea managed to maintain what is called a 
market average rate system—a semi-flexible exchange rate regime—from 1990 in 
which the exchange rate was determined by supply and demand of foreign reserves. 
Going even further back in time, Korea, for a decade time from 1980, maintained a 
currency basket peg system in which the currency was linked to a basket of multiple 
currencies. Before we move on to discussing the significance of introducing time 
differential to capture the effect of having different exchange rate regimes on monetary 
transmission, it is worth mentioning the opposing literary view that capital controls are 
irrelevant in the international transmission of US money shocks. In particular, Rodrik 
(1998) finds no evidence of a positive correlation between capital account openness and 
growth or investment/GDP ratios and argues against capital account convertibility 
(Rodrik, 1998). Furthermore, Miniane and Rogers finds that capital controls do not 
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insulate countries from US monetary shocks from examining a large range of country 
experiences. In defining capital openness, they assign countries to one of four categories, 
where a higher index denotes a more flexible regime. They find that countries with 
more stringent capital controls do experience smaller currency depreciations, but this 
result holds only at short horizons and only after conditioning on other country factors 
such as degree of dollarization. They also find that countries with stringent capital 
controls do not experience smaller interest rate increases in response to US 
contractionary monetary shocks. However, they report that the degree of dollarization 
does make a significant difference in transmitting these shocks. Countries that are 
highly dollarized experience more fluctuations in exchange rate or interest rate than 
countries that are not. It is important for us to make a distinction here, since this finding 
is crucial in deciding whether to include variables that could account for the different 
exchange rate regimes that Korea has went through in its history. Also, we must note 
that Miniane and Rogers find that US monetary shocks do influence economic factors in 
other countries in the short run. 
 Despite the strong evidence suggested by Rodrik, Miniane and Rogers, I find 
equally strong reasons to incorporate time differential into the model from the fact that 
Korea had different exchange rate regimes in different time periods and this may have 
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caused short run fluctuations in the variables that we study—GDP, interest rate, exports 
and Korea’s money supply. Also, as we have seen from Minane and Rogers’ study the 
degree of dollarization does produce a noticeable difference in transmitting monetary 
shocks from the US. Since Korea was less known prior to the eighties when it hosted 
the Olympics, foreign direct investment would have been considerably lower than in the 
nineties or the present. Adding to its small name, the stringent capital controls during 
the sixties and seventies would have prevented foreign investors from freely investing 
in Korea’s assets. These observations provide us with good reasons to include certain 
variables in our models to differentiate the effect of having different exchange rate 
arrangements in US monetary shock transmissions. Therefore, this paper will recognize 
the importance of having different exchange rate regimes in different time periods and 
will segment time into three periods, pre-1980s, 1980s and post-1980s in accordance 
with the different exchange rate regimes for the three time periods. (Miniane and Rogers, 
2006; Cottarelli and Kourels, 1994)
Page 24 | 73 
III. Hypothesis 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to identify the existence and estimate the 
form of relationship between US money supply and Korea’s output, net exports, interest 
rate and money supply. The theoretical underpinnings of this study will adopt certain 
aspects of the models discussed heretofore with the obvious advantage of reproducing 
an eclectic model having all the strengths and fewer weaknesses. In this chapter, we try 
to predict the direction of influence of the variables of interest in response to changes in 
US money supply overtime. Here, I use the term “overtime” to denote a trend over 
several decades which filters minor disruptions or anomalies to convincingly suggest an 
“actual” relationship. While short term responses of Korea’s GDP, for instance, may 
slightly vary across different time periods to changes in the US money supply, in 
aggregate, we hope to see an actual relationship between the two. Observing the impact 
of US monetary policy changes across multiple time periods helps in this regard. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Korea’s GDP is correlated with changes in US money supply. 
 First and foremost, it is important to ask whether monetary policy abroad will 
affect Korea’s domestic output and if so, in what way. Under the Mundell-Fleming 
Page 25 | 73 
model, Korea’s output, in response to a contraction in US money supply, will experience 
an expansion owing to a favorable exchange rate environment which helps to improve 
Korea’s net exports. In contrast, under the Obstfeld-Rogoff Redux model, output, in 
response to the same change in US money supply, will experience a substantial decline 
due to a surge in domestic short term interest rate. The apparent discrepancy calls for an 
actual estimation of the relationship to determine which model is a better fit for a small 
country case of Korea. Hence, the hypothesis will try to address the conflict between the 
two theories by first assuming that having a favorable exchange rate environment 
dominantly drives up the output in spite of the surge in short term interest rates, after 
adjusting for any other factors. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Korea’s exports are correlated with changes in US money supply. 
 Next, it is also of particular interest whether Korea’s exports will be affected by 
changes in US money supply or stay unchanged. The export industry is critical to 
Korea’s economic sustainability/ vitality. According to the Mundell-Fleming model, any 
changes in US money supply would shift the exchange rate so as to positively influence 
Korea’s exports. Additionally, the model predicts that any changes in US money supply 
would affect US income so that it induces more spending on imports. Thus, we would 
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expect to observe a co-movement in Korea’s exports and US money supply after 
adjusting for any other relevant factors. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Korea’s short term interest rate is correlated with changes in US money 
supply. 
 According to the Obstfeld-Rogoff model, any changes to the interest rate of a 
large country would be similarly matched by that of a small country. For example, if US 
money supply experiences a sharp decrease which drives up the interest rate in the short 
run, the interest rate of a small country would also upsurge. More practically speaking, 
in our case of US and Korea, US, being the large country, exhibits leadership in interest 
rate determination of a smaller country like Korea. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Korea’s monetary policy is correlated with US monetary policy. 
This is a particularly interesting scientific hypothesis to be tested. If, for 
instance, we postulate that the Korean monetary authorities closely monitor US 
monetary policy changes and act accordingly, we immediately recognize the presence of 
a domestic interest rate or credit channel which can be triggered by monetary policies 
from abroad. It can be reasonably conjectured that, assuming US monetary policies have 
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direct or indirect impact on the Korean economy, Korea’s monetary authorities would 
most likely react in some way to manage the shocks coming from US monetary changes. 
Going a step further, we are able to reason that in order to buffer the impact from any 
US monetary changes Korea would also react in some similar fashion by matching any 
changes from abroad. This is also the prediction laid by the Rediux model which states 
that any innovation to interest rate/money supply of a large country would be matched 
by that of a smaller country.  
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IV. Research Design 
 
1) Methodology 
This study will primarily rely on statistical analysis to derive an estimated 
relation between various Korean economic variables and US monetary policy. The 
statistical analysis in this paper adopts the Ordinary Least Squares method. 
 
2) The Data 
i) Source 
All of the information on the variables is collected from a single source, IMF 
International Financial Statistics online database. While there can be many sources from 
which information could be gathered, IMF Statistics (www.imfstatistics.org/imf/) stands 
as one of the most reliable and trustworthy source for any information related to 
macroeconomic analysis. Moreover, the consistency and accuracy of the data is 
guaranteed to be of the highest quality as many economists worldwide base their works 
on information provided by this site. In addition, gathering information from a single 
source with guaranteed quality has a major advantage in that the data is consistent 
throughout. For example, the units in which many economic variables are expressed in 
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are largely the same without any significant deviations. The time at which the variables 
exist are also synchronized so that there are no time discrepancies between variables. 
 
ii) Frequency 
All of the variables in the model are quarterly observations. While some 
variables are found to be more frequent than others, synchronization of all the variables 
to a single frequency allowed quarterly to be the most continuous. Moreover, while the 
frequency may not be as continuous as daily or monthly, the observation period of our 
data is fairly large spanning for more than 4 decades which is enough to make powerful 
inferences over the course of Korea’s industrialization history. As an aside, Korea 
achieved its independence in 1945 with the closing of World War II and suffered a civil 
war in 1950 until an armistice was signed three years after; as a result, Korea started 
relatively late in the industrialization race and having data from 1960 is the best 
available in the open market. 
 
iii) Variable Specification 
This section is devoted to the discussion of how the variables are specified and 
what meanings they hold. As US monetary policy is the crux of our model, much of the 
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discussion will rely on the interaction of US money supply with Korea’s various 
economic variables of interest. Below is a graphical illustration of the relationship 
between US money supply and Korea’s Exports. Normalizing scale, a simple visual 
inspection of the graph reveals that a common trend exists between the two. For the 
model, both US money supply and Korea’s Exports are expressed in logarithms to fit a 
linear trend. This means that the two variables have been transformed to log-forms so 
that after the change the relationship between the two variables can be defined linearly 
which is crucial to the Ordinary Least Squares Method we use in this paper. 
 
Figure 4. US Money Supply and Korea Exports Differential Over Time 
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Similarly, below is a graph of US money supply and Korea GDP displaying a 
rather common trend of development over time. Korea GDP is also expressed in 
logarithmic form to better establish a linear relationship with US money supply. 
 
Figure 5. US Money Supply and Korea GDP Differential Over Time 
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Likewise, money supplies of the two countries also exhibit a common trend. It 
may well be postulated that the monetary authorities in Korea closely monitor and 
benchmark US monetary policies. Korea money supply is also expressed in logarithmic 
form for the same reasons above. 
 
Figure 6. US & Korea Money Supply Differential Over Time 
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In contrast to the earlier developments, this one finds that US money supply 
and Korea interest rate have evolved opposite to each other, directly relating to the 
Obstfeld-Rogoff model discussed previously. To see how this is true, remember that an 
increase in the money supply causes the interest rate to decline. Note that any variables 
that come in percentages, including this one, have not been converted to logarithmic 
form as doing so would result in variable misspecification and biased estimators. 
 
Figure 7. US Money Supply and Korea Interest Rate Differential Over Time 
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Be aware that the graphs themselves are not much revealing other than a general 
trend of the variables and a formal statistical testing must be accompanied to draw any 
useful conclusions. To check for the linearity of the models please refer to the scatter 
plots in Appendix I. 
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3) The Models 
The first model is estimates output responses to changes in US monetary policy. 
As stated from one of the hypotheses earlier, this equation will estimate the relationship 
between Korea’s GDP and US money supply along with other relevant variables. 
Korea’s current output is regressed on previous period’s GDP, US money supply, 
domestic money supply and interest rates. Note that, for all of the four models dummy 
variables have been included to account for the time differential effects of US monetary 
policy. Hypothesis 1: 
 
i) GDPt = β0 + β1GDPt-1 + β2M*t-1 + β3Mt-1 + β4rt-1 + δ0low + δ1mid + 
δ2low×M*t-1 + δ3mid×M*t-1 + Ut 
 
Likewise, the second model estimates exports responses to changes in US 
monetary policy. Exports is regressed on itself for the previous period as well as US 
money supply, US GDP and domestic interest rates. Hypothesis 2: 
 
ii) XPt = β0 + β1XPt-1 + β2M*t-1 + β3GDP*t-1 + β4rt-1 + δ0low + δ1mid + 
δ2low×M*t-1 + δ3mid×M*t-1+ Ut 
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The third equation adopts a very similar approach to estimating the relationship 
between domestic interest rate and US interest rate as well as money supply. This model 
attempts to check the validity of the claim set forth by Obstfeld-Rogoff’s on importing 
interest rate changes from abroad. According to the Obstfeld-Rogoff model, any shift in 
a large country’s interest rates should be followed by a likewise shift in the small 
country’s interest rates. Hypothesis 3: 
 
iii) rt = β0 + β1rt-1 + β2r* t-1+ β3M*t-1 + δ0low + δ1mid + δ2low×M*t-1 + 
δ3mid×M*t-1 + Ut 
 
The last equation is included to observe Korea’s monetary policy stance on US 
monetary policy actions. As mentioned in Section III in this paper, this equation is 
particularly revealing in answering the question whether there is interest rate channel or 
credit channel at work magnifying the impact of initial monetary shocks from abroad. 
Hypothesis 4: 
 
iv) Mt = β0 + β1Mt-1 + β2M*t-1 + δ0low + δ1mid + δ2low×M*t-1 + 
δ3mid×M*t-1 + Ut 
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Where: 
 
GDPt is the natural log of Korea’s GDP at time t; 
GDP*t is the natural log of US GDP at time t; 
Mt is the natural log of Korea’s M2 Money Supply at time t; 
M*t is the natural log of US M2 Money Supply at time t; 
XPt is the natural log of Korea’s Net Exports at time t; 
rt is the yield on a 3-year Korean Treasury bond at time t; 
r*t is the yield on a 10-year US Treasury bond at time t; 
low is a dummy variable for time period prior to 1980; 
mid is a dummy variable for time period between 1980 and 1990; 
low×M*t is an interactive term of US M2 Money Supply and low at time t 
mid×M*t is an interactive term of US M2 Money Supply and mid at time t 
Ut is the error or disturbance term. 
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V. Empirical Results and Discussions 
 
The results obtained for the models are as follows (standard errors in parentheses): 
 
i) GDPt =  1.740  - 0.104GDPt-1 - 0.174M*t-1 + 0.083Mt-1 + 0.005rt-1 - 7.746low +0.199mid + 1.111low×M* - 0.019mid×M*
  (1.103) (0.095) (0.164) (0.099) (0.006) (1.560) (1.066) (0.215) (0.132) 
 
R-square = 0.9867 
Adj. R-Sq = 0.9858 
F value = 1210.22 
 
Estimation of the first model tells us that current GDP is negatively correlated 
previous US money supply holding other factors constant. Negative correlation between 
current GDP and previous quarter’s US money supply implies that quarterly 
observations follow the pattern described by the Mundell-Fleming model and is 
consistent with our primary hypothesis. The F-statistic is extremely high which suggests 
that, overall the coefficients of the variables are significantly different from zero. 
 
ii) XPt =  -6.569 + 0.572XPt-1 + 0.957GDP*t-1 - 0.064M*t-1 + 0.004rt-1 - 1.037low - 0.320mid + 0.163low×M* + 0.046mid×M*
  (1.392) (0.075) (0.284) (0.224) (0.004) (1.135) (0.720) (0.156) (0.092) 
 
R-square = 0.9932 
Adj. R-Sq = 0.9928 
F value = 2389.39 
 
Estimation of the second model also coincides with our prediction about the 
relationship between US money supply and Korea’s exports. A negative coefficient for 
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US money supply variable suggests that contraction (expansion) in the US money 
supply results in expansion (contraction) in Korea’s exports which was discussed in our 
second hypothesis. 
 
iii) rt =  7.941  + 0.874rt-1 + 0.133r*t-1 - 0.891M*t-1 - 12.433low - 9.833mid + 1.834low×M* + 1.188mid×M* 
  (7.491) (0.047) (0.083) (0.830) (12.708) (1.751) (1.052)   
 
R-square = 0.9672 
Adj. R-Sq = 0.9655 
F value = 560.73 
 
Estimation of the third model tells us that Korea’s interest rate imitates or 
follows the movement of US interest rates. This has precisely been the proposition set 
forth in our third hypothesis which was based on the Obstfeld-Rogoff model. 
 
iv) Mt =  -0.736 + 0.899Mt-1 + 0.165M*t-1 - 1.294low - 1.475mid + 0.165low×M* + 0.179mid×M*
  (0.430) (0.028) (0.066) (0.432) (0.653) (0.053) (0.082) 
 
R-square = 0.9988 
Adj. R-Sq = 0.9987 
F value = 25491.1 
 
The last result also coincides with our last prediction that Korea’s money 
supply may follow the movement in US money supply in order to restore balance in the 
Korean economy that might have been affected by the changes in foreign money supply.
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 In what follows, we discuss each of the estimated results in greater detail. With 
respect to the first regression, we found that Korea’s GDP is negatively correlated with 
US money supply. In conjunction with the last model and with certain reasonable 
assumptions this may yield a potentially interesting interpretation of the relationship 
between Korea’s GDP and US money supply. First let us review what the theory 
predicts. According to the Mundell-Fleming model of international monetary 
transmission, an increase in US money supply would stimulate domestic economic 
activity, at least in the short run, and an expansion in output would follow suit. This can 
lead to an increase in import demand from Korea,. Accordingly, an increase in US 
money results in wealth creation in Korea. Same results would be expected from the 
Obstfeld-Rogoff model, albeit through slightly different mechanism. An increase in US 
money supply would pull down the domestic interest rate which also similarly affects 
Korea’s interest rate. Having lower interest rate would spur investment activity and, as a 
result, Korea’s GDP would also go up. This does not seem to be the case in our 
estimated model, however.  
 The model predicts that, on average, a marginal percentage increase in US 
money supply would change Korea’s GDP by (17.4)%. This is a sizeable spillover effect. 
To gain further insight, consider the last estimated model, in which US money supply 
Page 40 | 73 
and Korea’s money supply share a positive correlation that is statistically significantly 
different from zero. This means that an increase in US money supply would induce a 
similar increase in Korea’s money supply as well. But, from above, we know that an 
increase in one country’s money supply stimulates domestic economic activity and 
expands output. Therefore, it may be the case where the effect of shifts in US money 
supply on Korea’s output is felt through a likewise adjustment in Korea’s money supply. 
To corroborate our argument, the parameter estimate for Mt-1 in the first equation is 
positive with high level of significance. And from the last equation, we also know that 
Korea’s money supply is positively influenced by US money supply, validating the 
argument. 
There are other possible reasons include the inclusion of dummy variables 
which might have diluted its true impact on Korea’s money supply. This would be 
analyzed in depth in the following section for robustness; however, this seems unlikely 
considering that the two nations were less connected prior to 1990 (when Korea floated 
its exchange rate) and the impact of US money supply was less felt.  
 Another possibility would be due to technical limitations of the model. The 
most prevalent technique used by the academia for studying any trend in 
macroeconomics including monetary transmission mechanism is the Vector Auto 
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Regression (VAR) method. Since, however, the technicality of it goes well beyond the 
scope of this research program, the author relied on using instead the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method. It is certainly possible, by using an alternative method, for the 
results to come out differently. The details of VAR will not be discussed in this paper, 
but the fact remains and leaves the task for future studies. 
 The second model is no less interesting than the first model in the same 
(which?) context of interest rate spillover effects. The two main parameter estimates in 
the model, for US GDP and US money supply, display a significant departure from each 
other. While the parameter estimate for US GDP is positive as expected with a p-value 
of 0.1% (having a low p-value means high significance, 1-5% is considered low in 
standard), it is less promising for US money supply. The estimate is not only negative, 
opposite to what theory predicts, but also statistically not much different from zero. A 
possible reason for this, and also the reason why it so fascinating at the same time, could 
be due to the same spillover effect of US money supply on Korea’s GDP. While US 
money supply may be linked to Korea’s GDP and exports in the manner theory predicts, 
the alternative channel of influence may be stronger to capture most of the effect, 
leaving the expected channel empty and insignificant. The rest of the variables also 
suffer from statistical insignificance, but with the only exception of Korea’s interest rate, 
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the coefficients come out as expected. 
 The third model fails to find any statistically significant relationship between 
Korea’s interest rate and the designed variables except for US interest rate at the 11% 
significance level. As with all other models, the dependent variable is regressed on an 
intercept, itself, US monetary policy measure, and plain as well as one-factor interactive 
dummies. While the US money supply is estimated to be insignificant, the key focus 
here would be on the US interest rate. The model predicts that, on average, a unit 
percentage movement in US 10 year Treasury yield would change Korea’s 3 year 
Treasury by 13.256%. This partially conforms to what the Obstfeld-Rogoff model 
suggests. In the event of a foreign money supply decrease, the theory predicts that 
country’s interest rate increase should be matched by a likewise increase in the domestic 
interest rate. While we cannot say anything about a reduction in the US money supply, 
the original catalyst, we know that the two country’s interest rate have been generally 
observed to move in tandem as claimed by Obstfeld and Rogoff’s strong interest rate 
linkage. If this is true, then from our earlier discussion about the two channels of 
monetary transmission (i.e., interest rate channel and credit channel) we are allowed to 
make policy recommendations regarding fighting off interest rate induced economic 
slowdowns which will be discussed later on. 
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 The last one is for testing Korea’s monetary policy stance on known US 
monetary policy actions. I use the term “known” here to denote the fact that one year 
lag of US money supply was used to fit this model. All the values are significant at the 
5% level with the expected signs. The estimated parameter value of US money supply is 
0.16501 with a p-value of 0.0133 (remember, having a lower p-value corresponds to 
increasing power of the estimate) meaning, a one percent increase (decrease) in US 
money supply would be responded by a 16.501% increase (decrease) in Korea’s money 
supply. This sheds some light on how Korean monetary authorities behave in response 
to a given change in US money supply.  
From this model alone, a definitive answer to the reason for their matching 
behavior can not be extracted but one possible explanation is as follows. Monetary 
policy largely serves two main purposes: 1) to control for inflation and 2) to foster 
growth. The Fed is well known for its extensive policy tools for achieving these two 
goals and the recent adjustment in the Fed Funds Rate is a good example of how it 
reacts to economic conditions. Similarly, the Bank of Korea is concerned with the 
mentioned objectives and whenever it sees any potential for over-growth it may want to 
moderate the process for price stability. Often the two policies come in trade-offs and 
having both at the same time is nearly impossible. But when the US expands its 
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monetary base and the effect is felt on Korea’s GDP, the relevant authorities may decide 
to trade growth for price stability and increase the money supply to match output growth. 
Considering that keeping inflation at a modest level is one of the most important 
objectives for any central bank, the argument is plausible in that it is aligned with the 
Bank of Korea’s interest.  
 In what follows, we conduct robustness checks on the models we estimate. 
These are aimed at addressing the two assumptions that we have made throughout: (i) 
the importance of time dummies reflecting a shift in Korea’s capital mobility over time 
and (ii) using money supply instead of the federal funds rate to proxy for monetary 
policy. 
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VI. Robustness 
 
In any macroeconomic analysis, a discussion about the possible outcomes of 
having different assumptions for the current model must be included. Typically this is 
referred to as robustness analysis which tests the ability of the model to withstand 
external stresses or changes in procedures or circumstances. This is critical to 
establishing the power of any economic analysis involving statistics, and therefore, one 
must carefully consider all the possible variations that can affect the results. Here, two 
such variations are considered: 1) Models without dummy variables and 2) Models 
using an alternative measure for US monetary policy—the Fed Funds Rate. 
 
1) Models Excluding Dummy Variables 
Conceptually, the exclusion of dummy variables in the model would have had 
the effect of ignoring any time differential. In other words, since the model is estimated 
without taking into account the potential difference in the effect of US money supply 
changes on Korea’s economy for different time periods, the models may lose some 
degree of accuracy. This is because the effect of US monetary policies in the 1970’s 
could be different from that of 1990’s but without the dummy variables to differentiate 
the combined effect would be reported under a single parameter for US money supply 
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(i.e., M*t-1).  
 We re-estimate our models by removing the time dummies. The results are 
shown in Appendix V. Observe that the models that were estimated without the 
dummies were not too different except for a few areas. From the first modified model, 
the first thing noticeable is that the effect of domestic interest rate on output has become 
statistically significant. In other words, the effect of interest rate on output is no longer 
significant when time dummies are included. That is, the interest rate after partialling 
out for time may not have as strong impact on domestic output as it with the time effect. 
This can be confirmed by the strong correlation existing between the interest rate and 
output which is reported in the correlation matrix on Appendix II. While interest rate 
alone is highly correlated with output, after the time differential has been controlled for 
it no longer is as important as before. 
 A similar case can also be found in the third equation where US money supply 
became statistically significant after not having any dummy variables. An interesting 
fact is that US interest rate has become statistically insignificant after the change, 
essentially swapping its statistical significance with US money supply. Since the two 
variables have extremely low correlation to each other (refer to Appendix II) it cannot 
be the case that US money supply absorbed the effect of US interest rate on Korea’s 
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GDP. And since the two variables do not share any commonality in terms of their 
estimated correlation, it must be due to the same time effect discussed above. 
 Everything considered, we have found that time is an important factor and the 
inclusion of dummies does bring about a few noticeable changes. The interpretation of 
the results, together with the underlying theories , remain the same, nevertheless. 
 
2) Models Using US Fed Funds Rate 
In the United States, the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) is the interest rate at which 
private depository institutions lend balances at the Federal Reserve to other depository 
institutions, usually overnight (Fed Reserve Bank of New York, 2007). It is a well 
known policy tool of the Fed for regulating the economy and has been found to be a 
good proxy for forecasting future economic activities (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). 
Additionally, it has been argued that US money supply is no longer an accurate measure 
of US’ monetary policies since it has been on a stable growth for many years. It is 
therefore the author’s reasoning that the FFR could potentially be a better measure than 
the money supply in reading off US monetary policy changes, and hence, the efficacy of 
this measure must be tested for. 
 Estimating the regressions in the usual OLS method, we immediately observe a 
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rather counter-intuitive result. US monetary policy, now measured by the FFR, is no 
longer decisive in determining any of the dependent variables! It certainly cannot be the 
case that US monetary policy’s influence on Korea’s economy has diminished or even 
disappeared after many years of advancing globalization and especially at this time 
when Korea is suffering together with the US in going through the mortgage crisis. 
Instead, the results seem to imply that the FFR is not a good proxy for US monetary 
policy, at least within these models. In fact, this dispels any anxiety or previous 
uncertainties about using US money supply and enhances the power of our original 
results. So, all in all, we have established that the models are quite powerful in the 
context of our definition of robustness and now we are finally ready to move on to 
summarizing the major findings of this research and make policy recommendations. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
Our analysis so far has revealed a number of interesting ways in which 
international transmission of monetary policies take place between the US and Korea. 
While some aspects appear less direct than others, it has been generally observed to 
have a direct effect on each other. For instance, in answering the provocative question 
“does Korea’s monetary policy get influenced by its counterpart in the US” we have 
seen that Korea’s monetary authorities routinely monitor actions by the US Fed to set 
directions for their own. This certainly must be the case considering that in the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Korea has adopted a free moving 
exchange rate system and the world is now far more integrated than before. Also by the 
very same token, the effects of foreign monetary actions are transmitted to Korea’s 
economy with less friction and with greater speed. This turned out to be the case from 
running the third regression where we found that the two countries’ interest rates are 
aligned to each other in their movements. So, for instance, if the US Fed decided to 
lower its monetary base target for the next year and implement its plan gradually, the 
change in the amount of money in circulation would decrease and would cause a direct 
effect on its interest rates. This would in turn influence Korea’s interest rates in such a 
way that it would deter investments within the country and thus contracting the overall 
Page 50 | 73 
economic activity. This effect, as was discussed in the literature survey, becomes more 
pronounced with the interest rate channel or the credit channel and the impact felt is 
magnified to be larger than its initial shock. This comes as no surprise when we 
consider the globalization process we have been pushing through and the world has 
become essentially like a big community where every country is connected to each 
other politically and economically. 
 A very important policy recommendation before we close our discussion is that 
the monetary authorities in Korea recognizing the potential impact of a shift in US 
monetary policies and their subsequent impacts towards the Korean economy must be 
controlled and contained. More practically speaking, the Korean monetary officials are 
willing to shift domestic money supply such that it counter-balances any impact from 
foreign monetary shocks. Since we know that the two countries are integrated to each 
other in the ways that we have discussed, a policy shift from the larger economy would 
inevitably trickle down to impact the smaller one, creating a spillover effect on the 
process. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that the effects must be closely studied for 
and referenced for deciding future actions to any changes in US monetary policies. This 
certainly has been the case throughout and it is with utmost importance that this policy 
be carried out in the same manner into the distant future. 
Page 51 | 73 
Appendix I. Scatter Plots  
 
Figure Appendix 1. Korea GDP vs. Korea M2 Scatter Plot 
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Figure Appendix 2. Korea GDP vs. Korea Interest Rate Scatter Plot 
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Figure Appendix 3. Korea GDP vs. US M2 Scatter Plot 
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Figure Appendix 4. Korea Exports vs. Korea Interest Rate Scatter Plot 
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Figure Appendix 5. Korea Exports vs. US M2 Scatter Plot 
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Figure Appendix 6. Korea Exports vs. US GDP Scatter Plot 
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Figure Appendix 7. Korea Interest Rate vs. US M2 Scatter Plot 
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00 120.00 140.00 160.00
US M2
Korea Interest Rate
 
 
Figure Appendix 8. Korea Interest Rate vs. US Interest Rate Scatter Plot 
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Figure Appendix 9. Korea M2 vs. US M2 Scatter Plot 
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Appendix II. Correlation Matrix 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
P rob > |r| under H0: Rho = 0 
 
    GDPt GDP*t Mt M*t rt r*t XPt 
GDPt Pearson Correlation 1 0.9895 0.99258 0.98734 -0.82057 0.00849 0.98777
  p value - <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9063 <.0001
  N 195 195 195 195 141 195 195
GDP*t Pearson Correlation 0.9895 1 0.99565 0.99882 -0.87236 0.06216 0.988
  p value <.0001 - <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3724 <.0001
  N 195 208 196 200 142 208 195
Mt Pearson Correlation 0.99258 0.99565 1 0.99275 -0.85716 -0.03766 0.98744
  p value <.0001 <.0001 - <.0001 <.0001 0.6003 <.0001
  N 195 196 196 196 142 196 195
M*t Pearson Correlation 0.98734 0.99882 0.99275 1 -0.88579 -0.00772 0.9885
  p value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 - <.0001 0.9136 <.0001
  N 195 200 196 200 142 200 195
rt Pearson Correlation -0.82057 -0.87236 -0.85716 -0.88579 1 0.70907 -0.84697
  p value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 - <.0001 <.0001
  N 141 142 142 142 142 142 141
R*t Pearson Correlation 0.00849 0.06216 -0.03766 -0.00772 0.70907 1 0.07892
  p value 0.9063 0.3724 0.6003 0.9136 <.0001 - 0.2728
  N 195 208 196 200 142 208 195
XPt Pearson Correlation 0.98777 0.988 0.98744 0.9885 -0.84697 0.07892 1
  p value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2728 -
  N 195 195 195 195 141 195 195
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Appendix III. Simple Linear Regressions  
(standard errors are reported in parentheses under parameter estimates) 
 
1) Dependent Variable GDPt  2)     
GDPt =  -11.21529 + 1.89099M*t  GDPt = 0.68797 + 0.66300Mt 
  (-0.2961) (-0.03699)    (-0.03719) (-0.00726) 
             
R-Square: 0.9495    R-Square: 0.9836   
Adj. R-Sq: 0.9491    Adj. R-Sq: 0.9835   
t value: 51.12    t value: 91.38   
             
3)            
GDPt =  5.95636 - 0.15224rt        
  (-0.1355) (-0.00899)        
             
R-Square: 0.6733          
Adj. R-Sq: 0.671          
t value: -16.93          
      
 
 
1) Dependent Variable XPt   2)     
XPt =  -13.80565 + 1.93181GDP*t   XPt =  -13.78517 + 2.07638M*t 
  (-0.15181) (-0.01762)     (-0.20683) (-0.02584) 
              
R-Square: 0.9886     R-Square: 0.9789   
Adj. R-Sq: 0.9885     Adj. R-Sq: 0.9788   
t value: 100.63     t value: 80.36   
              
3)             
XPt =  5.10766 - 0.16993rt         
  (-0.13631) (-0.00905)         
              
R-Square: 0.7174           
Adj. R-Sq: 0.7153           
t value: -18.78           
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1) Dependent Variable rt  2)     
rt =  2.9786 + 1.52908r*t  rt =  87.51507 - 9.25408M*t 
  (-0.98742) (-0.13037)    (-3.31055) (-0.41357) 
             
R-Square: 0.4974    R-Square: 0.7827   
Adj. R-Sq: 0.4938    Adj. R-Sq: 0.7811   
t value: 11.73    t value: -22.38   
 
 
1) Dependent Variable Mt 
Mt =  -18.00237 + 2.85828M*t
  (-0.34449) (-0.04304) 
      
R-Square: 0.96965   
Adj. R-Sq: 0.9692   
t value: 66.42   
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Appendix IV. Multiple Linear Regressions 
 
  The Reg Procedure     
  Model: MODEL1     
Dependent Variable: GDPt   
          
Number of Observations Read   278
Number of Observations Read   140
Number of Observations with Missing Values 138
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
      Sum of Mean     
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model   8 187.33749 23.41719 1210.22 <.0001
Error   131 2.53478 0.01935   
Corrected Total   139 189.87228    
 
Root MSE   0.1391 R-Square 0.9867
Dependent Mean 3.89708 Adj. R-Sq 0.9858
Coeff Var   3.5694     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
              
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept Intercept 1 1.74234 1.10291 1.58 0.1166
GDPt-1 lagkorgdp 1 -0.1035 0.09481 -1.09 0.277
M*t-1 lagusm2 1 -0.17386 0.16438 -1.06 0.2921
Mt-1 lagkorm2 1 0.80309 0.09926 8.09 <.0001
rt-1 lagkorbon 1 0.00495 0.00566 0.88 0.3827
low low 1 -7.74569 1.55966 -4.97 <.0001
mid mid 1 0.19854 1.06561 0.19 0.8525
low×M*   1 1.11144 0.21467 5.18 <.0001
mid×M*   1 -0.01888 0.13212 -0.14 0.8866
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Appendix IV. Multiple Regressions Cont’d 
 
  The Reg Procedure     
  Model: MODEL1     
Dependent Variable: XPt   
          
Number of Observations Read   278
Number of Observations Read   140
Number of Observations with Missing Values 138
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
      Sum of Mean     
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model   8 221.38182 27.67273 2389.39 <.0001
Error   131 1.51718 0.01158   
Corrected Total   139 222.899    
 
Root MSE   0.10762 R-Square 0.9932
Dependent Mean 2.80739 Adj. R-Sq 0.9928
Coeff Var   3.83336     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
              
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept Intercept 1 -6.56934 1.39237 -4.72 <.0001
XPt-1 lagkorxp 1 0.57195 0.07543 7.58 <.0001
GDP*t-1 lagusgdp 1 0.9566 0.28417 3.37 0.001
M*t-1 lagusm2 1 -0.06375 0.22424 -0.28 0.7766
rt-1 lagkorbon 1 0.00438 0.00449 0.98 0.3313
low low 1 -1.0366 1.13465 -0.91 0.3626
mid mid 1 -0.31978 0.71997 -0.44 0.6577
low×M*   1 0.16343 0.15622 1.05 0.2974
mid×M*   1 0.04575 0.09205 0.5 0.62
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Appendix IV. Multiple Regressions Cont’d 
 
  The Reg Procedure     
  Model: MODEL1     
Dependent Variable: rt   
          
Number of Observations Read   278
Number of Observations Read   141
Number of Observations with Missing Values 137
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model   7 5588.98353 798.42622 560.73 <.0001
Error   133 189.37897 1.4239   
Corrected Total   140 5778.3625    
 
Root MSE   1.19327 R-Square 0.9672
Dependent Mean 13.57392 Adj. R-Sq 0.9655
Coeff Var   8.79093     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
              
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
              
Intercept Intercept 1 7.94064 7.4909 1.06 0.291
rt-1 lagkorbon 1 0.87407 0.04722 18.51 <.0001
r*t-1 lagusbond 1 0.13256 0.08265 1.6 0.1111
M*t-1 lagusm2 1 -0.89052 0.83028 -1.07 0.2854
low low 1 -12.43261 12.70846 -0.98 0.3297
mid mid 1 -9.83265 8.29411 -1.19 0.2379
low×M*   1 1.83363 1.75072 1.05 0.2968
mid×M*   1 1.18838 1.05216 1.13 0.2607
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Appendix IV. Multiple Regressions Cont’d 
 
  The Reg Procedure     
  Model: MODEL1     
Dependent Variable: Mt   
          
Number of Observations Read   278
Number of Observations Read   195
Number of Observations with Missing Values 83
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model   6 1495.8037 249.30062 25491.1 <.0001
Error   188 1.83862 0.00978   
Corrected Total   194 1497.64233    
Corrected Total 194 1497.64233    
 
Root MSE   0.09889 R-Square 0.9988
Dependent Mean 3.44008 Adj. R-Sq 0.9987
Coeff Var   2.87474     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
              
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
              
Intercept Intercept 1 -0.73605 0.4301 -1.71 0.0887
Mt-1 lagkorm2 1 0.89887 0.02807 32.03 <.0001
M*t-1 lagusm2 1 0.16501 0.06599 2.5 0.0133
low low 1 -1.29376 0.43243 -2.99 0.0031
mid mid 1 -1.47511 0.65289 -2.26 0.025
low×M*   1 0.16475 0.05317 3.1 0.0022
mid×M*   1 0.17901 0.08163 2.19 0.0295
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Appendix V. Multiple Regressions without Dummy Variables 
(Refer to this appendix for robustness) 
 
  The Reg Procedure      
  Model: MODEL1      
Dependent Variable: GDPt    
           
Number of Observations Read    278
Number of Observations Read    140
Number of Observations with Missing Values  138
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
      Sum of Mean     
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
          
Model   4 186.66858 46.66714 1966.5 <.0001
Error   135 3.2037 0.02373   
Corrected Total 139 189.87228    
 
Root MSE   0.15405 R-Square 0.9831
Dependent Mean 3.89708 Adj. R-Sq 0.9826
Coeff Var   3.95293     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
              
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
              
Intercept Intercept 1 -0.5898 0.96632 -0.61 0.5427
GDPt-1 lagkorgdp 1 0.11949 0.09557 1.25 0.2133
M*t-1 lagusm2 1 0.14132 0.14168 1 0.3203
Mt-1 lagkorm2 1 0.56694 0.07678 7.38 <.0001
rt-1 lagkorbond 1 0.01306 0.00495 2.64 0.0093
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Appendix V. Multiple Regressions without Dummy Variables Cont’d 
 
  The Reg Procedure      
  Model: MODEL1      
Dependent Variable: XPt    
           
Number of Observations Read    278
Number of Observations Read    140
Number of Observations with Missing Values  138
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
      Sum of Mean     
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
              
Model   4 221.30312 55.32578 4680.17 <.0001
Error   135 1.59588 0.01182     
Corrected Total 139 222.899       
 
Root MSE   0.10873 R-Square 0.9928
Dependent Mean 2.80739 Adj. R-Sq 0.9926
Coeff Var   3.87285     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
              
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
              
Intercept Intercept 1 -5.07179 1.12911 -4.49 <.0001
XPt-1 lagkorxp 1 0.63635 0.07192 8.85 <.0001
GDP*t-1 lagusgdp 1 0.66989 0.23196 2.89 0.0045
M*t-1 lagusm2 1 0.04132 0.20014 0.21 0.8368
rt-1 lagkorbon 1 0.00259 0.0034 0.76 0.4483
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Appendix V. Multiple Regressions without Dummy Variables Cont’d 
 
  The Reg Procedure      
  Model: MODEL1      
Dependent Variable: rt    
           
Number of Observations Read  278
Number of Observations Used  141
Number of Observations with Missing Values  137
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
      Sum of Mean     
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
              
Model   3 5576.60285  1858.86762 1262.22 <.0001
Error   137 201.75965 1.4727     
Corrected Total 140 5778.3625       
 
Root MSE   1.21355 R-Square 0.9651
Dependent Mean 13.57392 Adj. R-Sq 0.9643
Coeff Var   8.94029     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
              
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
              
Intercept Intercept 1 10.80553 3.31894 3.26 0.0014
rt-1 lagkorbond      1 0.89136 0.037 24.09 <.0001
r*t-1 lagusbond 1 -0.01372 0.0492 -0.28 0.7807
M*t-1 lagusm2 1 -1.16577 0.36098 -3.23 0.0016
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Appendix V. Multiple Regressions without Dummy Variables Cont’d 
 
  The Reg Procedure      
  Model: MODEL1      
Dependent Variable: Mt    
           
Number of Observations Read  278
Number of Observations Used  195
Number of Observations with Missing Values  83
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
      Sum of Mean     
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
              
Model   2 1495.69352  747.84676 73679.4 <.0001
Error   192 1.9488 0.01015     
Corrected Total 194 1497.6423       
 
Root MSE   0.10075 R-Square 0.9987
Dependent Mean 3.44008 Adj. R-Sq 0.9987
Coeff Var   2.92864     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
              
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
              
Intercept Intercept 1 -1.1076 0.39277 -2.82 0.0053
lagkorm2 lagkorm2 1 0.93337 0.02176 42.89 <.0001
lagusm2 lagusm2 1 0.1838 0.06228 2.95 0.0036
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Appendix VI. Multiple Regressions Using Fed Funds Rate 
 
  The Reg Procedure     
  Model: MODEL1     
Dependent Variable: GDPt   
          
Number of Observations Read   278
Number of Observations Read   140
Number of Observations with Missing Values 138
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
      Sum of Mean     
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
              
Model   8 187.31629 23.41454 1200.05 <.0001
Error   131 2.55599 0.01951   
Corrected Total   139 189.87228    
 
Root MSE   0.13968 R-Square 0.9865
Dependent Mean 3.89708 Adj. R-Sq 0.9857
Coeff Var   3.5843     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
              
Intercept Intercept 1 0.607 0.27526 2.21 0.0292
GDPt-1 lagkorgdp 1 -0.09583 0.09505 -1.01 0.3153
FFR*t-1 lagusffr 1 -0.00101 0.00669 -0.15 0.8808
Mt-1 lagkorm2 1 0.73957 0.07891 9.37 <.0001
rt-1 lagkorbon 1 0.00831 0.00544 1.53 0.129
low low 1 -7.34524 1.55731 -4.72 <.0001
mid mid 1 -0.1601 1.07515 -0.15 0.8819
low×M*   1 1.04938 0.21239 4.94 <.0001
mid×M*   1 0.02336 0.1332 0.18 0.861
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Appendix VI. Multiple Regression Using Fed Funds Rate Cont’d 
 
  The Reg Procedure     
  Model: MODEL1     
Dependent Variable: XPt   
          
Number of Observations Read   278
Number of Observations Read   140
Number of Observations with Missing Values 138
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
      Sum of Mean     
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model   8 221.39615 27.67452 2412.33 <.0001
Error   131 1.50285 0.01147   
Corrected Total   139 222.899    
 
Root MSE   0.10711 R-Square 0.9933
Dependent Mean 2.80739 Adj. R-Sq 0.9928
Coeff Var   3.81521     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
              
Intercept Intercept 1 -6.42941 1.38658 -4.64 <.0001
XPt-1 lagkorxp 1 0.58584 0.0755 7.76 <.0001
GDP*t-1 lagusgdp 1 0.87709 0.17765 4.94 <.0001
FFR*t-1 lagusffr 1 -0.00591 0.00513 -1.15 0.2507
rt-1 lagkorbon 1 0.00637 0.00458 1.39 0.1667
low low 1 -0.75386 1.14969 -0.66 0.5132
mid mid 1 0.01571 0.7671 0.02 0.9837
low×M*   1 0.12367 0.15808 0.78 0.4354
mid×M*   1 0.0052 0.097 0.05 0.9573
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Appendix VI. Multiple Regression Using Fed Funds Rate Cont’d 
 
  The Reg Procedure     
  Model: MODEL1     
Dependent Variable: rt   
          
Number of Observations Read   278
Number of Observations Read   141
Number of Observations with Missing Values 137
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
      Sum of Mean     
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model   7 5590.06853 798.58122 564.07 <.0001
Error   133 188.29397 1.41574   
Corrected Total   140 5778.3625    
 
 
Root MSE   1.18985 R-Square 0.9674
Dependent Mean 13.57392 Adj. R-Sq 0.9657
Coeff Var   8.76571     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
              
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
              
Intercept Intercept 1 0.03909 0.39074 0.1 0.9205
rt-1 lagkorbon 1 0.90643 0.03372 26.88 <.0001
r*t-1 lagusbond 1 0.04465 0.11587 0.39 0.7006
FFR*t-1 lagusffr 1 0.11715 0.08447 1.39 0.1678
low low 1 -6.61688 9.71631 -0.68 0.4971
mid mid 1 -12.64443 8.41705 -1.5 0.1354
low×M*   1 1.10971 1.39138 0.8 0.4265
mid×M*   1 1.58245 1.06633 1.48 0.1402
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Appendix VI. Multiple Regression using Fed Funds Rate Cont’d 
 
  The Reg Procedure     
  Model: MODEL1     
Dependent Variable: Mt   
          
Number of Observations Read   278
Number of Observations Read   195
Number of Observations with Missing Values 83
 
    Analysis of Variance       
              
      Sum of Mean     
Source   DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model   6 1495.74502 249.29084 24701.7 <.0001
Error   188 1.8973 0.01009   
Corrected Total   194 1497.64233    
 
Root MSE   0.10046 R-Square 0.9987
Dependent Mean 3.44008 Adj. R-Sq 0.9987
Coeff Var   2.92026     
 
    Parameter Estimates       
              
      Parameter Standard     
Variable Label DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
          
Intercept Intercept 1 0.32 0.11114 2.88 0.0044
Mt-1 lagkorm2 1 0.95417 0.01719 55.51 <.0001
FFR*t-1 lagusffr 1 -0.00191 0.00386 -0.49 0.6212
low low 1 -1.40567 0.45671 -3.08 0.0024
mid mid 1 -1.40887 0.73574 -1.91 0.057
low×M*   1 0.18106 0.05712 3.17 0.0018
mid×M*   1 0.17359 0.09158 1.9 0.0596
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